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13 Note, e.g., Tillich’s observation that “Spinoza’s 
influence [on his work] is prophetic and mystical as well 
as sapiential,” ST, 3, 3.  
14 See ST, 1: Part 2 (‘Being and God’) and Biblical 
Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1955). 
15 See ST, 1: Part 2 (“Being and God”) and The Cour-
age to Be. 
16 Note that these three forms of anxiety correlate 
with the three moments in Tillich’s dialectical concept of 
life—the moments of self-creation (mortality), self-
integration (morality), and self-transcendence (meaning-
lessness or tragedy)—and the three moments in his under-
standing of sin (discussed below)—concupiscence, unbe-
lief, and tragic hubris. 
                                                                            
17 Tillich, The Courage to Be, 189. 
18 See ST, 1: Part 2 (‘Being and God’), ST, 3: Part 4 
(‘Life and the Spirit’) and Love, Power, and Justice: On-
tological Analyses and Ethical Applications (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1954). On “holiness,” see 
Rudolf Otto’s The Idea of the Holy (London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1958, 2nd edition).  
19 See ST, 1: 252-271 (“God as Creating”) and ST, 2: 
Part 3 (“Existence and the Christ”). 
20 See ST, 2: Part 3 (“Existence and the Christ”). 
21 See ST, 3: Part 4 (“Life and the Spirit”).  
22 See ST, 3: Part 5 (“History and the Kingdom of 
God”). 
23 “For of him, and through him, and to him, are all 
things” (Rom 11:36); quoted in ST, 3: 6. 
 
 
Confronting the Powers: Tillich, 
Stout, and West on Democratic  




 Recent debates regarding the formal characteris-
tics of democracy have been widespread and po-
lemical. Whether construed in terms of imperialistic 
concerns (e.g., the imposition of American political 
values on non-democratic and non-Western coun-
tries), constitutional questions (e.g., the blurring of 
church and state through administered services of 
faith-based organizations or religiously affiliated 
hospitals), or identity politics (e.g., the question of 
whether democracy protects and cultivates pluralism 
or homogenizes and reduces otherness to sameness), 
these debates compel interrogation of the basic pre-
suppositions underlying democratic principles and 
procedures and the extent to which theological re-
flections inform these presuppositions. Paul Tillich 
experienced the horrors of non-democratic seizures 
of power in his German homeland, and his emigra-
tion to America deepened his resistance to the de-
monic powers that dehumanize, destroy, and domi-
nate social and political life. This essay argues that 
Tillich’s writings on political life, particularly his 
1933 The Socialist Decision, challenge democratic 
theorists and current public policy makers to rethink 
their assumptions about the form, function, and 
meanings of democracy. 
 My purpose is to engage Tillich and present in-




quires a multi-layered analysis: (1) An excursus into 
the historical trajectories in American politics vis-à- 
vis the relationship between church and state that 
problematizes strict separation and strict union; (2) 
An engagement between Tillich and Jeffrey Stout 
and Cornel West on the anthropological, experien-
tial, and religious dimensions of democracy; and (3) 
An analysis of the present policies of President Bush 
and the “elite” democracy of Richard Posner with 
respect to the perspectives of Tillich, Stout, and 
West. My thesis holds that separation, whether con-
strued in terms of the strict separation between 
church and state, between individual and commu-
nity, or between power and justice, has over-
determined contemporary visions of democracy at 
substantial moral costs. Though they differ in sig-
nificant ways, the models of democracy envisaged 
by Tillich, Stout, and West more comprehensively 
address the necessarily dialectical interplay between 
separation and union within a democracy than the 
policies implemented by the Bush administration. 
 
I. A Brief History of Church-State Relations: 
 Separation and Democracy 
 
 Discussion of the church-state relations can be 
traced back to the Gospels, when Jesus’ dictum to 
render unto Caesar (Mark 12:17; cf. Matthew 22:21) 
exposed the co-existence of two spheres, religious 
and political. Models of the interaction of these two 
spheres range from Augustine’s two cities, Aqui-
nas’s eternal, natural, and human laws, and Martin 
Luther’s two kingdoms. To contextualize our analy-
sis of democracy and its modern theological and phi-
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losophical discontents, we must limit our scope to a 
brief examination the trajectory of the church versus 
state debate in the United States. Such an examina-
tion reveals the ambiguities embedded in notions of 
strict separation. Philip Hamburger begins his 2002 
Separation of Church and State by citing the “strict 
wall of separation between Church and State”1 in 
Thomas Jefferson’s 1802 letter to the Danbury Bap-
tists. Hamburger works meticulously to disabuse the 
assumption that such a wall of separation was 
unanimously embraced or even actively tolerated by 
American religious and political actors. Examining 
the writings of seventeenth and eighteenth century 
Protestants such as Richard Hooker and Roger Wil-
liams, Hamburger clarifies that their misgivings 
about union between church and state “was not a 
demand for separation.”2 Hamburger argues that 
practices such as the exclusion of clergy from civil 
office stemmed from a variety of factors,3 but these 
factors did not include the grounds of separation. In 
the early nineteenth century, motivated by political 
exigencies, Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans 
opposed the Federalists and began to promote a 
separation between church and state that persuaded 
later presidents such as James Madison and Andrew 
Jackson. Yet, in what Stout and West would praise 
as thick description, Hamburger explains that these 
appeals to separation were largely politically moti-
vated rhetorical devices until they confronted the 
practical religious conflicts in the mid-nineteenth 
century, notably the rise of anti-Catholicism. 
Spurred by violent clashes and quarrels over public 
school funds between Protestants and Catholics and 
exacerbated by Catholic resistance to separation, 
many Protestants “used the principle of separation to 
argue against Catholic participation in politics.”4 
These conflicts increasingly helped instill separation 
among the Protestant majority as cultural assump-
tions that contributed to the evolving democratic 
traditions. 
 An insightful component of Hamburger’s analy-
sis (and one that has relevance for our discussion of 
democratic principles) is his recognition of the moral 
costs of a purely procedural separation. Hamburger 
notes that separation, in some contexts, enabled 
“Americans to fend off moral demands with which 
they did not wish to comply”5 and thereby raised the 
democratic stakes of the distinction between church 
and state. These moral costs reflected the reticence 
of political minorities and the church to offer critical 
voices that, as we will observe with respect to West, 
Stout, and Tillich, constitute sine qua non for de-
mocracy. Despite these costs, separation continued 
to gain favor after the Civil War, when President 
Ulysses Grant championed separation as the best 
way to preserve individual freedom. This call for 
freedom was embraced in the early twentieth century 
by nativist Protestant groups, including the deci-
sively undemocratic Ku Klux Klan, whom Ham-
burger holds, “probably more than any other national 
group in the first half of the [twentieth] century, 
drew Americans to the principle of separation.”6 
Driven by the “culture of Americanism and its con-
ception of separation as an American liberty”7 and 
continuously funded by anti-Catholicism (exempli-
fied by the reaction to Catholic Al Smith’s presiden-
tial bid) but also emergent secularism, separation as 
a fundamental aspect of American democracy con-
tinued to marshal support.  
Nonetheless, Hamburger notes, it was not until 
1947 in Everson v. Board of Education of the Town-
ship of Ewing (330 U.S. 1) that the Supreme Court 
finally interpreted the First Amendment as requiring 
separation of church and state.8 In writing the deci-
sion for the court, Justice Black cited Jefferson’s 
1802 letter advocating for the wall of separation, 
thus suggesting circularity to the historical phe-
nomenon of separation. But this circularity, as will 
be noted in the next section with respect to the myth 
of origin, cannot address the in-breaking of the new. 
Hamburger describes the paradoxical reception of 
the Everson decision in decades that followed: 
“Even as Americans wondered about separation’s 
meaning, they treated its constitutional legitimacy as 
sacrosanct. Having enshrined the doctrine of separa-
tion in their Constitution, they deferred to it with 
reverence and viewed any dissent from it as pro-
foundly anti-American.”9 This failure to examine 
self-reflexively the principles and procedures of 
one’s own democratic traditions accounts for the 
present polemical debates and the potentially un-
resolvable democratic disagreements regarding sepa-
ration. 
Hamburger’s work thus reveals the ways in 
which the roots and formation of separation lie less 
in purely constitutional foundations but rather in a 
conflicted history that occasionally restricted free-
dom when “American majorities used the separation 
of church and state to impose their vision of their 
religion and their Americanism upon religious mi-
norities.”10 Such a history serves as a useful point of 
departure for our study because it invites critical re-
flection on mediating grounds between union and 
separation within a democracy.  
Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 32, 4, Fall 2006 
 
16 
The remainder of the essay will expand the 
question of union and separation of church and state 
to encompass the questions of union and separation 
within the democratic process as a whole. 
 
II. Stout, West, and Tillich: Confronting the 
 Challenge of Separation 
A. Stout’s Pragmatic Mediation of Rawls/Rorty and 
 Hauerwas/Milbank 
 
 The basic thesis of Jeffrey Stout’s 2004 Democ-
racy and Tradition is that democracy is a tradition, 
that is, it “inculcates certain habits of reasoning, cer-
tain attitudes toward deference and authority in po-
litical discussion, and love for certain good and vir-
tues.”11 As we will note below with respect to West 
and Tillich, Stout foregrounds his discussion of po-
litical structures and procedures with an analysis of 
its humanly experienced motivations and effects. 
Stout’s pragmatism, which he designates as “democ-
ratic traditionalism,”12 therefore locates the signifi-
cance of democratic tradition not within procedures 
but rather within the formation of “enduring atti-
tudes, concerns, dispositions and patterns of con-
duct” wherein “normative commitments are embed-
ded as well as discussed.”13 These normative com-
mitments signify the products of deliberative de-
bates, always subject to the “critical scrutiny”14 ad-
vocated by Tillich and West, and necessarily involve 
appeals to religion. These appeals vitiate the as-
sumptions of strict separation within democracy. 
The questions regarding the role of religion within 
democratic tradition, Stout believes, have been com-
plicated by two approaches, one the secular liberal 
approach of thinkers such as Rawls and Rorty, and 
the other the new traditionalism of Hauerwas and 
Milbank, which, for radically distinct reasons, sepa-
rate religion and democracy. Stout depicts the 
prominence of these two approaches as interrelated: 
“The more thoroughly Rawlsian our law schools and 
ethics centers become, the more radically Hauerwa-
sian the theologically schools become.”15 Thus, 
Stout’s book seeks to mediate between the separa-
tion of religion and democracy, that is, between the 
Rawlsian/ Rortian view of religion as a conversa-
tion-stopper for democratic consensus and the Hau-
erwasian/ Milbankian view of religion that neglects 
the importance of democracy for religious structures 
and beliefs. 
 Stout’s brand of pragmatism appropriates vari-
ous strategies to carry out this mediation. Stout 
combines the Hegelian Sittlichkeit, criticisms of 
Kantian pure practical reason (also noted by Til-
lich),16 and dialectical normative expressivism with 
an Emersonian celebration of historical conscious-
ness and “a form of social life that celebrates democ-
ratic individuality as a positive good.”17 Democracy 
must therefore accommodate individual, community, 
and society in ways that do not reduce their interac-
tions to purely abstract formalism or procedures. 
Stout posits that religious voices must contribute to 
the ongoing conversation of what undergirds democ-
racy. Whereas Milbank’s Theology and Social The-
ory “leaves democracy almost entirely out of the 
picture,”18 Stout lauds Barth’s Barmen Declaration 
that opposed the Nazis as “a theologically rich ac-
count of what it means for Christians to be involved 
in modern, secularized political communities.”19 
Though Stout seemingly oversimplifies the radical-
ity of Barth’s theology20 that some interpreters, in-
cluding Tillich, have critiqued, Stout concludes that 
Barth’s assertion of truth claims is vital to democ-
racy because “[w]ithout truth-claims, there would be 
no communication, no exchange of reasons.”21  
Stout castigates Stanley Hauerwas for conceptu-
alizing democratic citizens as “essentially rootless 
individuals”22 or, as I have identified it, as essen-
tially separated individuals. Hauerwas’s own vision, 
informed by Yoder and MacIntyre, does not endorse 
democracy in the decisive means for cultivating vir-
tue; rather, his view insists that the Christian life is 
revealed in faith narratives, which Stout argues are 
located within a “premodern authoritarian tradi-
tion.”23 Stout’s criticisms are trenchant, but he does 
not fully appreciate the extent to which Hauerwas 
does affirm Christian participation in democratic 
structures. As Hauerwas has written: “[Christians] 
have a stake in fostering those forms of human asso-
ciation that ensure that the virtues can be sus-
tained.”24 Stout’s critique, however, does correctly 
point to the limits of Hauerwas’s perspectives, vis-à-
vis democracy as a tradition. Hauerwas’s view can-
not appreciate that our situatedness in a democracy 
necessitates the formation of broader communal 
frameworks and participation in discursive practices 
of normative expressivism that shape character and 
identity without eviscerating individual uniqueness 
or truth claims. 
 Stout affirms that these discursive practices can 
and should make claims to truth instantiated, for ex-
ample, in Christian claims. How then can Stout 
bring together the Rawlsian call for consensus and 
the Hauerwasian demand for distinctiveness? Does 
Stout’s mediated solution exact any moral costs of 
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its own? Stout’s rejoinder minimizes these moral 
costs by coalescing objective and subjective moral 
dimensions, where “[p]ragmatism offers a social 
theory of moral objectivity—according to which 
both objective ethical norms and the subjectivity of 
those who apply them are made possible in part by 
social interactions among individuals.”25 In terms of 
the moral objectivity, Stout argues that the expres-
sive function of democracy can entail claims to un-
conditional obligations without violating the democ-
racy as a discursive and social practice. In terms of 
moral subjectivity, even as he repudiates the corre-
spondence theory of truth because “it has no ex-
planatory values,”26 Stout insists that moral diversity 
neither reduces democratic conversation to a relativ-
ist conception of truth nor results in an “antithe-
ological” stance.27 Stout determines that “[t]he con-
cept of truth is normative,” but his pragmatist rem-
edy demands that we “drop the identification of truth 
with power.”28 Thus, in Stout’s judgment, religious 
claims or other truth claims shorn of their meta-
physical presuppositions can fund critical democ-
ratic reflection on the normative rules and substan-
tive meanings of political discourse. In ways similar 
to the establishment of soccer rules as an “objective 
affair,”29 Stout envisions that religious claims con-
tribute to the rational revision of democratic princi-
ples and procedures. These revisions reflect careful, 
but contentious dialogue within thick cultural con-
texts, though Stout’s model admits latitude and even 
reversals “when we undergo social and spiritual cri-
ses”30 and thereby must transcend our own tradition. 
This dialectic of tradition and crisis affords neces-
sary correctives to the strict separation between the 
theoretical and practical dimensions of democratic 
reflection. 
 
B. West’s Pragmatic Mediation of Imperialism and 
Nihilism  
Cornel West is a synthetic intellectual who, 
similar to Stout and Tillich, diagnoses the current 
situation and correlates it with answers by meditat-
ing different traditions. Indebted to the “unasham-
edly moral emphasis and its unequivocally ameliora-
tive impulse”31 of American pragmatism, Marxism,32 
and critical poststructuralist theory, West employs a 
structural and prophetic critique of democracy. In his 
2004 book, Democracy Matters: Winning the Fight 
Against Imperialism, West juxtaposes the three most 
pernicious threats to democracy—free-market fun-
damentalism, aggressive militarism, and escalating 
authoritarianism—with the traditions that sustain 
democracy—Socratic questioning, prophetic cri-
tique, and tragicomic hope.33 The threats to democ-
racy derive from two principal sources, an imperial-
istic and corporate-driven base of power, and the 
general apathy of a society reluctant to challenge this 
power that separates individuals, communities, and 
society. The vibrancy of a democracy, cautions 
West, depends crucially on democratic vigilance, a 
core characteristic of the democratic traditions in 
America.  
One of West’s insights, as we observed with 
Stout and will with Tillich, is that theorizing about 
democracy requires inquiry into human anthropol-
ogy and the humanly experienced beliefs (particu-
larly despair, cynicism, and hope) vis-à-vis the pros-
pects for democratic procedures. West steadfastly 
asserts with John Dewey and Ralph Waldo Emerson 
that “[d]emocracy is not just a system of govern-
ance, as we tend to think of it, but a cultural way of 
being.”34 West and Stout both understand democracy 
as principally a way of life and not a configuration 
of procedures, but Stout suggests that their anthropo-
logical perspectives regarding democracy signal a 
key distinction between his pragmatism and West’s: 
“But we differ over the grounds of democratic hope 
in a way that leaves me closer to Ellison and him 
closer to an Augustinian like Reinhold Niebuhr.”35 
Disturbed that “Socrates never cries”36 and therefore 
misunderstands democracy’s tragic character, West 
holds with Niebuhr (and Tillich) that one must take 
seriously the flaws, faults, and moral blindness of 
individual and systems. These faults and blindness—
encapsulated in Augustine’s notion of the self curva-
tus in se—problematize democratic assumptions and 
exacerbate separation. I therefore argue that West’s 
anthropological model more effectively captures the 
current discontent for democratic practices than 
Stout’s.37 West explains that Dewey’s pragmatism—
a pragmatism to which both Stout and West are in-
debted—fails to “meet the challenge posed by Lin-
coln, namely, defining the relation of democratic 
ways of thought and life to a profound sense of 
evil.”38 Identifying Josiah Royce but also Chekhov, 
Coltrane, and Niebuhr as those who confronted this 
challenge, West affirms that “a deep sense of evil 
and the tragic must infuse any meaning and value of 
democracy.”39 Recognizing the inexorable tensions 
between evil and good, tragic and hope, or, as Tillich 
puts it, the inner contradiction of human life, West 
affirms that pragmatism renders these tensions pro-
ductive by promoting individual volition and com-
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munal justice in the face of historical limits, human 
evil, and fateful circumstances.  
In addressing this evil, tragic, but ineluctably 
hopeful current context, West builds on his earlier 
book Race Matters and characterizes the current 
situation as one of crisis or consciousness of mean-
inglessness and nihilism among minority and mar-
ginalized communities. Using language that resem-
bles Stout’s idea of crisis and Tillich’s ontological 
concepts of non-being and estrangement, West de-
scribes the youth of America: “[M]any lack the nec-
essary navigational skills to cope with the challenges 
and crises in life—disappointment, disease, death. 
This is why so many are enacting the nihilism of 
meaninglessness and hopelessness in their lives that 
mirrors the nihilism of the adult world.”40 This nihil-
ism has a perniciously self-destructive character that 
West identifies as “walking nihilism,” or “the impos-
ing of closure on the human organism, intentionally, 
by that organism itself.”41 The resonance between 
West’s walking nihilism and Tillich’s demonic will 
be noted below, but, here it is imperative to note that 
what is equally troubling for West is the moral 
blindness to this destruction and self-destruction that 
lies at the roots of the American democratic tradi-
tion. West argues that the practice of slavery and 
imperialist exploitation “were undeniable precondi-
tions for the possibility of American democracy.”42 
These racist and imperial preconditions impose a 
hypocritical separation of individuals onto the 
American democratic foundations; they press Til-
lich’s system, though it refutes dehumanization, to 
rethink its drive toward self-centeredness, and they 
censure Stout’s attempt, though it acknowledges the 
pernicious effects of racism, to unify the objective 
and subjective dimensions of democratic life. In 
fleshing out the moral costs of this exploitative basis 
for democracy, West would additionally criticize 
Tillich’s appeal to elite forms of art as only partially 
disclosive of form and meaning that must also in-
clude forms of popular culture (e.g., hip-hop) and 
power struggles in the streets.43 
 
Given West’s concerns for the racist and imperi-
alistic dimensions of democracy, he turns, as does 
Stout, to resources within democracy’s traditions to 
retrieve and self-reflexively to critique these founda-
tions. West appeals to two strands, an Emersonian 
and a Melvillean strand. The former, represented by 
thinkers such as James Baldwin, focuses on the indi-
vidual commitment to democracy and democracy’s 
potential, but it also seeks to “inspire an America 
caught in a web of self-deception and self-
celebration.”44 The latter, represented by thinkers 
such as Toni Morrison, unmasks the procedures and 
prejudices that threaten individuality and intends to 
“shatter moral numbness and awaken sleepwalk-
ing.”45 Both hermeneutical strands resonate with Til-
lich’s religious socialism and cultivate resistance by 
critically correlating democratic practices, beliefs, 
and procedures in a way that restores relationships 
between individuals, communities, and society. 
Christianity, in West’s judgment, provides a vital 
role in this resistance, for “[t]he most influential so-
cial movements for justice in America have been led 
by prophetic Christians.”46 West adamantly de-
nounces a Christian co-opting of power, tantamount 
to a Constantinian Christianity, that threatens toler-
ance and open dialogue, and therefore he censures 
the “terrible merger of church and state [that] has 
been behind so many of the church’s worst viola-
tions of Christian love and justice.”47 In light of 
Hamburger’s history of the complex variables that 
impact relations between church and state, West’s 
point is well-taken, but it would need to be recon-
ceived more carefully to address better the underly-
ing issues. 
However, similar to Hamburger’s problematiz-
ing of strict separation discussed above, West also 
resists the temptation to compartmentalize and 
thereby separate religion and democracy. In explic-
itly endorsing the attractiveness of Stout’s mediating 
between secular liberals and religious traditional-
ism,48 West, on the one hand, gainsays Rawls’s pro-
ceduralism (“it fails to acknowledge how our loyalty 
to constitutional and civic ideals may have religious 
motivations”49) and Rorty’s pragmatism (“his secu-
lar policing of public life is too rigid and his secular 
faith is too pure”50). On the other hand, West cannot 
concur with Hauerwas’s vision (“he unduly down-
plays the prophetic Christian commitment to justice 
and our role as citizens to make America more free 
and democratic”51) and Milbank’s model (“he fails 
to appreciate the moral progress, political break-
throughs, and spiritual freedoms forged by the he-
roic efforts of modern citizens of religious and secu-
lar traditions.”52) In his own forging of a prophetic 
pragmatism as an intermediary between these per-
spectives, West insists that Christianity must play an 
important role without usurping or co-opting secular 
power, lapsing into utopia or radical pessimism, or 
eliminating the problem of fatedness; rather, Christi-
anity and prophetic pragmatism strengthen democ-
racy by interrelating the potency of human creativity 
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for good and evil with the absolute demands of jus-
tice within the postmodern context marked by “de-
graded otherness, subjected alienness, and subaltern 
marginality.”53 In this way, Christianity and democ-
racy are neither completely separate nor completely 
unified, and West affirms the formula articulated by 
the “prophetic pragmatist” theologian Reinhold Nie-
buhr: “Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy 
possible; but man’s inclination to injustice makes 
democracy necessary.”54 
 
C. Tillich’s Prophetic Critique of Power 
In the Foreword to his 1933 The Socialist Deci-
sion, Paul Tillich reflects on the crisis of the situa-
tion, where the enemies of socialism “threaten the 
future of the nation and of Western civilization.55 
The mobilization of the Nazis terrorized individuals, 
communities, and society, and Tillich works to com-
bat such atrocities.56 Yet, similar to Stout’s and 
West’s appeal to Socratic questioning, Tillich’s di-
agnosis of the situation also includes self-reflexive 
interrogation of one’s own political agenda, where 
“[a] movement that no longer questions the rightness 
of its own assumptions has become ossified” be-
cause this movement “must unmask all ideologies, 
including its own.”57 As part of this process, in ways 
similar to Stout’s privileging of Hegelian Sittlichkeit, 
though aware of its limitations,58 Tillich attempts to 
circumscribe the political movement within the unity 
of being and consciousness or “the interrelation of 
drives and interests, of pressures and aspirations, 
which make up social reality.”59 To account fully for 
being and consciousness, however, Tillich appropri-
ates the ontological polarities of individuality and 
universality and freedom and destiny. Social reality 
must be infused with ontological reality to ascertain 
that being and consciousness entail the universal: 
“Human beings become human by participating in 
universal reason.”60 The appeal to universal reason 
does not disqualify the particular, but it compels po-
litical reflections on power that sustain the particular 
but also transcend the particular: “Being comes to 
fulfillment only by transcending its immediate 
power.”61 The pragmatism of Stout and West rightly 
press the epistemological limits of Tillich’s ontol-
ogy, but Tillich’s ontology, in return, can push Stout 
and West to transcend their situated pragmatism.   
In analyzing the presuppositions of political ro-
manticism, Tillich isolates the dominant myth of the 
origin. This myth of the origin, rooted in blood, soil, 
and social groups and resonant with many of Bush’s 
policies (see next section), can be broken only 
through the prophetic “unconditional demand”62 for 
justice. This unconditional demand applies to politi-
cal powers but also to Christianity: “A Christianity 
that abandons its prophetic foundation by allying 
itself with political romanticism has lost its own 
identity.”63 Tillich then makes an important observa-
tion that suggests that prophetic critique and democ-
ratic freedom are not antithetical; a fortiori, in and 
through the example of Liberal Protestantism, “it has 
become evident that prophetism as well as autonomy 
in their isolation from each other eventually fall back 
again into the myth of origin.”64 Prophetic critique 
helps ensure that power and freedom do not become 
exclusively heteronomous or autonomous (that is, 
constitutively separate) but rather theonomous ex-
pressions of the interpenetration of religion and cul-
ture, the import of the Unconditional and autono-
mous cultural consciousness. 
To be sure, the objectives of Tillich’s religious 
socialism do not equate precisely to West’s and 
Stout’s traditions of American democracy,65 but they 
do articulate the function of the political in terms of 
social or communal duties (prophetic demands for 
justice) and individual freedom.66 Perhaps more 
pointedly, all three thinkers recognize the potency of 
political mechanisms and their deleterious effects on 
individual, community, and society or, as I have put 
it, the moral costs. Tillich describes the rise of the 
national power-state, the fusion of “the myth of ori-
gin and capitalistic imperialism,”67 that has, in the 
case of Germany during Tillich’s time, stifled de-
mocratic procedures and subdued the democratic 
spirit: “The German bourgeoisie has never fought to 
actualize the democratic demands of its own princi-
ple” because “it accommodated itself to feudal 
forms.”68 In these ways, the myth of origin cannot 
overcome its contradiction and cannot protest ade-
quately against “the dehumanizing consequences of 
an exclusively rational system”69 that “oppress and 
crush the individual.”70 The sophistication of Til-
lich’s historical, philosophical, and theological 
analysis in addressing these moral costs responds to 
West’s cautious limitation of religion’s contribution 
to democratic reflections attributable, in West’s 
judgment, to its inability to “provide the analytical 
tools”71 and its “lacking in serious philosophical 
substance.”72 Tillich’s more substantive vision of the 
role of religion extends Stout’s claim that religion 
can contribute to democratic tradition. 
In turning to the bourgeois principle and the pro-
letariat, Tillich further examines democracy as “the 
rational drive to shape reality”73 and the democratic 
Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society, vol. 32, 4, Fall 2006 
 
20 
presuppositions of religious socialism. Democracy 
and religious socialism function as correctives for 
each other and not as forces of separation. On the 
one hand, Tillich contends that the democratic prin-
ciple promoting “the free decisions of all individu-
als” becomes “thwarted, however, by the reality of 
class rule.”74 Religious socialism therefore presses 
democracy and its susceptibility to the exploitative 
capacities of capitalism by adopting “the prophetic 
attitude.”75 On the other hand, attributable to its own 
inner antimony or contradiction, religious socialism 
needs democracy because just power reflects “the 
actualization of social unity” and the inclusion of 
individual will within “the will of the whole.”76 De-
mocracy challenges religious socialism to adopt hu-
man structures, where, for example “[r]ationality in 
economics is not to be abrogated but is to be placed 
into the hands of human beings.”77 In this way, de-
mocracy functions as a “corrective”78 to religious 
socialism’s own mediating between the myth of the 
origin’s quest for power and the ultimate demands of 
justice. Religious socialism and democracy converge 
in expectation: “This is the deeper meaning of egali-
tarianism, of the demand for equality, in prophetism 
and socialism. The inescapability of the demand, a 
demand, that is addressed to everyone, makes all 
persons equal.”79 This pursuit of equality does not 
translate into merely democratic equitable proce-
dures; rather, given that expectation entails both the 
universal, unconditional demand for justice and con-
ditional practices grounded in the concrete situation 
(both of which are encapsulated in Tillich’s term 
belief-ful realism),80 expectation—similar to Stout’s 
concept of crisis and West’s concept of hope—must 
be both immanent and transcendent. Democratic, 
socialist, and prophetic expectation constitutes “a 
protest against false concepts of transcendence that 
inevitably call for, in opposition, false concepts of 
immanence.”81 These false concepts of transcen-
dence include an empirically derived utopia—
analogous to the utopias that concern West—that 
can take the form of one that “is impotent against 
the actual forces of society,”82 a reactionary restora-
tion of male patriarchalism,83 or “the hegemony of 
the myth of origin [that] means the domination of 
violence and death.”84 These false forms of democ-
ratic life reinforce and ossify the status quo in ways 
that prohibit or stifle transformation. Similar to 
West’s “walking nihilism,” Tillich’s concept of the 
demonic expresses this lack of transformation: it is 
“possession” (Besessenheit) that inhibits self-
centeredness because it is an attack (Angriff) on the 
oneness and freedom of the individual.85 Moreover, 
similar to West, Tillich indicates that the demonic 
can take on a social dimension that engenders self-
sufficient finitude in the form of capitalism and cor-
rupts power in the form of nationalism, or the great 
demonic of the present (Gegenwart).86 The in-
breaking of theonomous forms of prophetic critique 
and democratic corrective as imports of hope and 
self-transcending realism overcome demonic separa-
tion and promote reunion and healing of individuals, 
communities, and society. Tillich describes this 
moment as the idea of Kairos, “which also does not 
lead to rational utopianism or to the mystical nega-
tion of the world, but, rather to a new and creative 
fulfillment of forms with an import borne by power 
and eros but penetrated by obedience to uncondi-
tioned form.”87 Kairos thus also meditates between 
strict separation and strict union—a mediation that 
the Bush administration seems unable or willing to 
pursue. 
 
III. Bush and Posner: The Hermeneutics of 
 Democratic Distrust 
 
The current United States administration, in my 
judgment, does not promote a democracy governed 
by concerns for social justice and the interrelation-
ship between union and separation. Firmly en-
trenched in its own myth of origin, the Bush admini-
stration appears ossified in the circular movement of 
preserving its own origin of power. As Tillich writes 
in The Socialist Decision, “This demand [of the 
myth of origin] does not reach out to the new, to that 
which transcends the origin. It confirms the origin, 
but does not go beyond it. It confirms the powers of 
origin, the feudal and priestly authorities.”88 The in-
sulated bureaucracy of the Bush administration, 
whether illustrated in its unilateral pursuit of war, its 
reconfiguration of the Geneva Convention’s rules for 
prisoner interrogation,89 or its privileging of large 
corporations on environmental and tax issues, cre-
ates procedures that reinforce its own power base 
and separate and marginalize individuals. Addition-
ally, as Stout, West, and Tillich caution, any politi-
cal principle and procedure must be subject to a 
radical, self-reflexive critique. For example, consider 
Bush’s policies pertaining to the war on terror. To be 
sure, threats to security demand proactive measures 
that perforce compromise some of the ideals of de-
mocracy in order to preserve other values, but West 
and Stout both articulate criticisms of the Bush’s 
policies, that is, they note the moral costs of such 
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measures. West points to the ill-conceived democ-
ratic rationale underlying Bush’s strategies: “The 
Bush administration has subverted the public in or-
der to leads its war against terrorism in the way it 
wanted to—attacking Iraq and instituting the dan-
gerous doctrine of preemptive strike rather than fo-
cusing on the real terrorist threat.”90 Stout similarly 
indicates that self-reflexive critique has been absent 
thus far in the war on terror: “In the long run, the 
ideological-moral front is the one on which the 
struggle against terrorism will be won or lost, and 
we are now losing it badly. In truth, there is only one 
way to win it, namely, by applying our ideals and 
principles to our own conduct with the same sense of 
purpose and courage that we demonstrated when 
denouncing Taliban thugs.”91   
A recent articulation of democracy by legal 
theorist and federal judge Richard Posner encapsu-
lates many of the current administration’s sensibili-
ties. Posner appropriates pragmatism, but a form of 
pragmatism quite distinct from that of West and 
Stout. Posner’s everyday pragmatism, whose roots, 
he suggests, lie in Machiavelli,92 seeks to disengage 
itself from academic pragmatic philosophy93 or criti-
cal reflection on the moral dimensions and costs of 
democracy. Posner envisages the democratic process 
as one of competition, where, appealing to the work 
of Joseph Schumpeter, he submits that democracy 
should be an elite democracy: “Here democracy is 
conceived of as a method by which members of a 
self-interested elite compete for the votes of a basi-
cally ignorant and apathetic, as well as determined 
self-interested, electorate.”94 The self-interested po-
litical elite therefore exploits social structures and, as 
West put it above, the public’s sleepwalking lack of 
resistance to confront this exploitative power. Posner 
distinguishes the transformative and participatory 
democratic models of Mill and Dewey (and, we 
might add, Stout, West, and Tillich) that focus on 
the “cooperative search for truth”95 from his pre-
ferred Machiavellian and Weberian vision of democ-
racy that “requires a willingness to compromise, to 
dirty one’s hands, to flatter, cajole, pander, bluff, 
and lie, [and] to make unprincipled package deals.”96 
This willingness to dirty one’s hands has been a 
hallmark of the Bush administration. These practices 
may protect some democratic values, but we must 
again ask at what moral costs.   
The limitations and flaws of Posner’s model of 
democracy and Bush’s enforcement of it can be 
categorized around two central loci. First, Posner’s 
anthropological assumptions delimit human beings, 
particularly his reductive portrait of humans as 
“merely clever animals.”97 His focus on rational self-
interest as the primary mode of being in the world 
disavows the central roles of communal values, prin-
ciples, and traditions as well as the unity of being 
and consciousness advocated by Tillich. Posner’s 
everyday pragmatism insists that individuals within 
a democratic and free-market environment necessar-
ily would “focus on their material concerns, personal 
interests, and opinions.”98 Stout’s model also invites 
such focus on concerns and interests, but in ways 
that foster dialogue and not monologues of power. 
Posner’s anthropological reductions inform a second 
weakness, his myopic and attenuated assessment of 
common impulses to participate in democratic pro-
cedures. “The United States is a tenaciously philis-
tine society. Its citizens have little appetite for ab-
stractions and little time and less inclination to de-
vote substantial time to training themselves to be-
come informed and public-spirited voters.”99 Em-
phasizing the efficiency and procedural aspects of 
democracy in ways analogous to corporate manage-
ment, Posner submits that “[t]he relation of officials 
to voters resembles that between sellers and con-
sumers”100 Posner’s elitist model suffers from what I 
denominate as a hermeneutics of trust and distrust—
a trust in the ideology and internal mechanisms of a 
powerful elite and a distrust of democratic principles 
and traditions among the majority. Such a herme-
neutics balkanizes competing voices and centralizes 
power, paradigms that clearly operate within the 
Bush administration. This separation exacerbates 
tendentious clashes along ideological, ethnic iden-
tity-based, and class lines. 
 
IV. Concluding Reflections 
 
 Where does this leave us? What constructive 
proposals might be gleaned from the American his-
tory of the separation of church and state, the in-
sights of Stout, West, and Tillich, and the challenges 
to Bush and Posner? I offer a few modest proposals 
as a conclusion. Through our procedures and power 
structures, we have lost sight of the individual within 
the democratic process. Reclaiming the voice of the 
individual within the cacophony of lobbyists, parti-
san rhetoric, and corporate posturing seems vital to 
our democratic health. Writing his Democratic Vis-
tas shortly after the crisis of the Civil War, Walt 
Whitman, beloved by West and Stout alike, admon-
ishes the individual to “[a]lways inform yourself; 
always do the best you can; always vote” but, at the 
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same time, to remain vigilant against opportunistic 
political parties: “it behooves you to convey yourself 
implicitly to no party, nor submit blindly to their 
dictators, but steadily hold yourself judge and master 
over all of them.”101 Whitman’s commitment to the 
individual within democracy, tempered by a herme-
neutics of suspicion (and not a hermeneutics of trust 
and distrust), underscores the dialectical character of 
separation and union between individual, prophetic 
critique, and democratic structures.  
The communities of democratic discourse also 
have been attenuated by separatists groups (e.g., 
Stout’s criticisms of Black nationalism), marginal-
ized groups (e.g., West’s diagnoses of nihilism and 
meaninglessness of those disenfranchised), and de-
humanized groups (e.g., Tillich’s concerns over the 
corrosive features of capitalism). One mechanism 
that could re-invite these groups back into the col-
lective would be to cultivate what Jane Mansbridge 
identifies as protective enclaves to support the 
voices of muted communities and to reconfigure 
hardened boundaries.102 Such enclaves enrich the 
democratic exchange of ideas, surmount the impasse 
of language and power, and ameliorate the one-
sidedness of separation or union. Our three inter-
locutors have argued that these voices must be 
heard. Rather than promoting the distrust of religion 
within society (Rorty and Rawls), distrust of the 
masses (Posner and Bush), or distrust of democracy 
(Hauerwas and Milbank), Tillich, Stout, and West 
affirm that we must consider the prospects for and 
the challenges of ultimate concern, the formation of 
individuals in and through social participation, the 
interpenetration of religion and culture, and the ten-
sions between evil and good, power and justice, and 
tragedy and hope. Addressing these dimensions re-
quires that we consider both the immanence of thick 
historicism and our situation and the transcendence 
of the prophetic critique and spiritual crisis. Though 
they differ on the specific meanings of these dimen-
sions, Stout, West, and Tillich articulate the anthro-
pological, experiential, moral, and axiological di-
mensions of democracy in ways that can revitalize 
our troubled democracies. 
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